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Abstract
Many conservation programs offer financial compensation to
farmers in exchange for socially desired services, such as soil con-
servation or biodiversity protection. Realization of the conserva-
tion objective at minimum cost requires payments to just cover
the extra costs incurred by each individual (type of) farmer. In
the presence of information asymmetries regarding costs, incentive-
compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compen-
sation, but these typically only provide partial improvement be-
cause of several distortions. We argue that these distortions are
inevitable only if all conservation costs are variable in nature. If
there are fixed costs too, we find that the least-cost solution can
be incentive compatible. We identify the exact conditions un-
der which these maximum savings can be obtained and conclude
that, given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation services
provision, incentive—compatible contracts deserve a second look.
Key words: Asymmetric information, environmental bene-
fits, green payments, mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, increasingly more conservation programs have
been set up that offer financial compensation to farmers in exchange
for the provision of socially desired services, which they would not have
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provided otherwise. Such activities include, among others, implement-
ing measures to conserve soils or to protect biodiversity. These so-called
green payment programs have been implemented in developed and de-
veloping countries alike (see for example OECD 1997 and Ferraro 2001),
and usually take the form of contracts between the donor (or regula-
tor) and individual landowners. These contracts specify the type and
level of conservation activities the landowner is required to undertake on
her land, as well as the amount of money she receives in compensation.
Participation is in most instances voluntary, and hence the amount of
money offered should at least cover the extra costs incurred.
The problem is that in many instances (i) some landowners can pro-
vide conservation services at lower costs than others, and (ii) landowners
have better information about these costs than the donor (cf. Ferraro
2005). That means that low—cost landowners have an incentive to over-
state the costs of providing specific levels of conservation activity in
order to secure more generous compensation payments. Overgenerous
payments are typically costly to the donor either because the available
funds are limited (in case of a fixed conservation budget) or because
there are non—zero costs to raising funds (cf. for example Smith and
Tomasi 1999). Hence, the donor has a stake in separating the low— from
the high—cost landowners.
In essence, this is a classical mechanism design problem, and over
the past years many papers have been published that build on the sem-
inal work of, among others, Mirrlees (1971), Groves (1973), Dasgupta
et al. (1979), Harris and Townsend (1981), and Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984). Early papers include Smith (1995) who analyzed how mecha-
nism design theory could be applied to the US Conservation Reserve
Program, aiming to return a specific amount of agricultural land to na-
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ture while minimizing the total amount of compensation payments paid;
Smith and Tomasi (1995) who analyzed the problem of limiting pollu-
tion runoff from farm land when compensation payments are funded by
means of distortionary taxation; and Wu and Babcock (1995 and 1996)
who looked at the problem of reducing polluting input use when land
quality differs across farmers and where raising funds for compensation
is socially costly.
This literature focuses on the case where the donor has full informa-
tion about all relevant economic characteristics of the various farm types1
but is unable to identify what type each individual farmer is. Given this
form of information asymmetry, the general conclusion is that offering a
menu of contracts specifying management prescriptions and associated
compensation payments can indeed result in higher social welfare than,
for example, a uniform policy applicable to all farmers —but not always
(see for example Wu and Babcock 1996: 943).
Despite the fact that these incentive—compatible contracts can be
welfare—enhancing, their use is all but widespread (Ferraro 2005). Two
reasons may explain this lack of real—world application. First, the in-
formation requirements for the donor are substantial, and second the
savings in payments (or subsidies) achieved are fairly small. The first
reason is obvious, but the second needs somewhat more explanation.
The theoretical literature on this topic indeed shows that separating the
low— from the high—cost farmers may be possible, but always at a double
cost. To ensure incentive—compatibility, contracts are such that compen-
sation payments to the low—cost farmers are still larger than actual costs
incurred (in other words, they still receive informational rents), while the
1Relevant characteristics inculde those factors that affect farmers’ opportunity
cost of providing conservation services, such as their agricultural production func-
tions, their land quality, etc.
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conservation level required from the high—cost farmers is below the com-
plete information solution’s optimal level. Because of this double cost,
the net benefits of designing incentive—compatible contracts are likely
to be low, and attention seems to have shifted towards alternative in-
struments, such as for example procurement auctions for conservation
contracts (cf. Ferraro 2005: 7; Latacz—Lohmann 2004, Latacz—Lohmann
and Schilizzi 2006).2
The double cost of incentive—compatible contracts materializes be-
cause of one key characteristic of the models developed in this litera-
ture, and that is their focus on variable conservation costs. Typically,
agents are assumed to differ with respect to a certain characteristic, and
this characteristic is assumed to affect the marginal benefits (or costs) of
the regulated input. For example, in case of Wu and Babcock (1996), a
farmer’s marginal productivity of polluting input use is assumed to be an
increasing function of the quality of her land. That means that farmers
with high (low) quality land are high—cost (low—cost) producers of con-
servation services. The presence of these variable costs of conservation
services implies that the complete information solution is typically not
incentive—compatible. With complete information, the optimal amount
of input reduction is a decreasing function of land quality; high—cost
conservers should conserve less. This is also the case in the presence
of asymmetric information. But whereas in the complete information
2Auctions have their own disadvantages too. To work well, auctions need to be
collusion-free as well as simultaneous (rather than sequential, to prevent learning
by the farmers about the bids of their peers and the behavior of the regulator); see
Latacz-Lohmann and Schillizzi (2006). Preventing collusion is of course difficult in
the real world given that, by definition, all potential bidders live in the same region
and are able to easily identify their fellow participants in the auction. And auctions
are inevitably sequential in nature, as a simultaneous auction of all conservation
efforts is infeasible in practice. Therefore, whereas procurement auctions may be a
superior instrument than (uniform) contracts, the efficiency gains obtained may be
lower than predicted by theory.
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solution the associated compensation payments would be increasing in
land quality (implying that high—cost farmers receive more money in
compensation than low—cost farmers), the second—best contracts under
asymmetric information require payments to fall with land quality. In-
deed, under asymmetric information the complete information solution
is not incentive compatible because it would give low—cost farmers a
double incentive to report themselves as high—cost farmers. They would
not just be offered less stringent management practices (i.e., less reduc-
tion in input use), but larger compensation payments as well (Wu and
Babcock 1996: 939).
This paper contributes to this literature by not only taking into ac-
count heterogeneity regarding variable conservation costs but also with
respect to fixed costs. While these fixed compliance costs can be substan-
tial in practice, they have been largely ignored by researchers and policy
makers alike (cf. European Commission 2005: 22). Fixed costs can be
the costs of setting up management plans, but they can also take the
form of up-front investments without which conservation is not feasible.
Using the example of biodiversity oconservation, such investments may
include planting trees, digging ponds, or building hedgerows, to create a
minimum amount of habitat for species to survive or to establish them-
selves. But given that the necessary conditions for conservation have
been created, the actual amount of biodiversity conservation achieved
also depends on decisions like the types of crops cultivated, the amount
of fertilizer and pesticides used, etc. Obviously, if farmers continue spray-
ing their fields with highly toxic pesticides, conservation objectives are
not achieved even if trees or hedgerows have been planted on the plot’s
perimeter. Reducing pesticide use increases species conservation but at
increasing costs (in terms of agricultural revenue foregone).
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This is just one example where fixed and variable costs matter, but
it is not difficult to find other too. And of course it may well be the
case that farmers differ in how costly it is to reallocate arable land to
conservation structures like ponds, hedgerows and trees, and also differ
with respect to their opportunity costs of agricultural output as a func-
tion of the reduction in the use of polluting inputs such as fertilizers or
pesticides.
We find that when taking into account both fixed and variable con-
servation costs, incentive—compatible contracts can achieve maximum
efficiency after all: that is, the double cost of separation does not nec-
essarily arise. We develop a model with two farmer types differing in
both variable and fixed costs, where the objective of the donor is to
achieve a certain aggregate conservation objective at minimum cost.3
We find that separating contracts always result in lower subsidies than
uniform contracts, and that maximum efficiency can be achieved espe-
cially for intermediately high conservation targets. Our policy conclusion
is therefore contrary to the one drawn by Ferraro (2005). Even though
the information requirements may be quite substantial, the benefits of
implementing separating policies may be sufficiently large to warrant
implementation.
The conclusion that fixed costs matter for incentive—compatibility
may be surprising. All conservation contracts offered require strictly
positive levels of conservation effort, and hence fixed costs are not ex-
3We therefore implicitly assume the donor to have multiple conservation projects,
and then her decision problem is properly characterized as aiming to meet each of her
conservation targets at minimum expense. But the reader may think that the case
where the donor has a single conservation target and a fixed budget may be relevant
too. Then her decision problem is to maximize conservation given the size of her
budget. The “maximize conservation” case is the dual of the “minimize cost” case
analyzed here, and all our results remain valid in this case. The complete analysis of
the “maximize conservation” case is available upon request.
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pected to play a role. To provide positive levels of conservation effort
the fixed costs need to be incurred independently of the contract cho-
sen, and hence these fixed costs are sunk from the farmer’s perspective.
However, these fixed costs do matter because they affect the amount of
compensation payments targeted at each type. The payments consist
of two parts; the compensation for the variable costs and for the fixed
costs. If a farmer with low variable costs and high fixed costs (relative
to the other type) would choose the contract targeted at the other type,
she saves on her variable costs (because of the less stringent manage-
ment requirements imposed). But if she thus declares herself to be of
the high—variable—cost type, she would then also receive the compensa-
tion payment for that type’s fixed costs. If these are sufficiently smaller
than the compensation for the fixed costs of her own type, she prefers to
reveal her own type truthfully and choose the contract targeted at her
type.
In addition to showing that the complete information solution can
be incentive compatible (and under what circumstances), this paper of-
fers two more contributions to the extant literature, one arising because
of the existence of fixed costs, and one because of the fixed conser-
vation objective. Regarding the role of fixed costs, we show that in
those cases in which the complete information’s optimal solution is not
incentive—compatible in the presence of asymmetric information, infor-
mational rents accrue to the type with lowest total costs, and hence not
necessarily to the type with the lowest variable costs. And if the ag-
gregate conservation objective is fixed, both farmer types’ management
requirements are distorted when the complete information solution can-
not be implemented: low (high)—variable—cost farmers are required to
exert larger (lower) conservation efforts than under the complete infor-
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mation contract.
Since the objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of fixed costs
on the feasibility of the least—cost solution under asymmetric informa-
tion, our approach is admittedly simplified in several other respects.
First, we abstract from the moral hazard problem that is inherently
present in real world situations —that complying with the required con-
servation levels is hard to detect (but see among others Ozanne et al.
2001 and White 2002). Second, we assume that the donor has perfect
information about the (economic) characteristics of the various farmer
types but does not know which farmer is of what type. We therefore
focus on an asymmetry in status information but not in information
collection ability (cf. Goeschl and Lin 2003). Third, we assume that
the donor just knows the distribution of types, but does not have any
farmer—specific information on the basis of which she could assign prior
believes regarding the farmer’s type (but see Moxey et al. 1999). Fourth,
our model is such that even under asymmetric information, the amount
of conservation effort is always higher in case of a conservation scheme
than in its absence because we assume that the privately optimal level
of conservation effort is zero (but see Motte et al. 2004 and di Corato
2006).
The setup of this paper is as follows. We present the model in sec-
tion 2, and provide the solution to the complete information problem
in section 3. In section 4 we analyze whether the least—cost incentive—
compatible contract under asymmetric information is uniform or sep-
arating. In section 5, we characterize the optimal policy under asym-
metric information and, in particular, we show the circumstances under
which the complete information solution is incentive compatible. We
draw conclusions in section 6. The details of the optimization problem
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under asymmetric information can be found in the appendix.
2 The model
The objective of the donor is to induce a group of farmers to undertake a
certain amount of biodiversity conservation effort. There are two types
of farmers, indexed i = 1, 2, where ni > 0 denotes the total number of
farmers of type i. Conservation effort of a farmer of type i is denoted
by bi. The minimum aggregate level of conservation effort required is
B > 0. Therefore, B ≤
∑2
i=1 nibi.
To provide positive levels of conservation services (i.e., bi > 0), the
farmer needs to incur both fixed and variable costs. These two types of
costs are denoted by Fi and ci(b), respectively, and hence total private
conservation costs are Ci (b) = Fi + ci (b). Here, Fi ≥ 0, and ci (b)
is assumed to be increasing and convex in b with ci (0) = c
′
i (0) = 0.
Also, we arbitrarily assume that c′2 (b) > c
′
1 (b) and c
′′
2 (b) > c
′′
1 (b) for all
b > 0, so that type 1 farmers are always the low—variable—cost providers
of conservation services.
Participation is voluntary, which means that farmers of type i need
to receive compensation payments (or subsidies, Si) that are at least
as large as the amount of conservation costs incurred for the effort pre-
scribed (Si ≥ Ci(bi)). Subsidies are costly in the sense that money spent
on the current project cannot be spent elsewhere. Therefore, the objec-
tive of the donor is to achieve total conservation effort B at minimum
budget.
If the donor has perfect information about each particular farmer,
the problem is to find the menu {(S1, b1) , (S2, b2)} which satisfies the
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following:
min S˜=n1S1 + n2S2, (1a)
s.t. B ≤ n1b1 + n2b2, (1b)
Fi + ci (bi)− Si ≤ 0, i = 1, 2. (1c)
However, in case of asymmetric information, the donor has to take
into account the incentive compatibility constraints. This means that
the menu offered has to be such that each farmer actually prefers the
particular policy targeted at its type. That is, the donor needs to ensure
that
ci (bi)− Si ≤ ci (bj)− Sj , (2)
where i = 1, 2 and i 	= j.
The donor can design a uniform policy, that is a single combination
of b and S that is offered to all farmers. Such a uniform policy, (Su, bu),
is trivially incentive compatible and that means that one of the partici-
pation constraints will not be binding. Since the donor wants to achieve
B, the uniform policy is straightforward:
bu =
B
n1 + n2
; Su = max {C1 (b
u) , C2 (b
u)} . (3)
The donor may also offer a menu of policies consisting of specific
combinations of S and b targeted at the different farmer types. In case
of two farmer types, a separating policy would thus consist of two combi-
nations of subsidies and management requirements, (Ss1, b
s
1) and (S
s
2, b
s
2).
The key question is whether such a separating scheme is better than a
uniform contract, with regard to achieving a given aggregate conserva-
tion effort at lower aggregate subsidies.
10
3 Complete Information
Let us first determine the menu of subsidies and management require-
ments {(Sc1, b
c
1) , (S
c
2, b
c
2)} which yields the complete information solution
to problem (1). The Lagrangian is the following:
L = n1S1 + n2S2 + µ
[
B − n1b1 − n2b2
]
+
2∑
i=1
λi [Fi + ci (bi)− Si] ,
where µ ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0 are the Kuhn—Tucker multipliers associated with the
conservation objective and the participation constraints, respectively.
The first—order conditions are:4
λic
′
i (bi) + µni = 0; (4a)
ni − λi = 0; (4b)
µ
[
B − n1b1 − n2b2
]
= 0; B − n1b1 − n2b2 ≤ 0; (4c)
λi [Fi + ci (bi)− Si] = 0; Fi + ci (bi)− Si ≤ 0. (4d)
where i = 1, 2. From (4b), we obtain λi = ni > 0. This implies Fi +
ci (b
c
i) − S
c
i = 0 (see (4d)) and µ = c
′
1 (b
c
1) = c
′
2 (b
c
2) (see (4a)). In
words, the required conservation efforts are such that marginal costs are
equal, and subsidies are paid to exactly cover conservation costs. Since
c′2 (b) > c
′
1 (b) for all b > 0, we trivially have b
c
1 > b
c
2. Thus, the effort
level required from type 1 farmers is larger than that of type 2 farmers.
However, there is no trivial ranking with respect to the required subsidy
levels because of the presence of fixed costs. Clearly, c1 (b
c
1) > c2 (b
c
2)
5,
but Sc1 > (<)S
c
2 if and only if F2 − F1 < (>) c1 (b
c
1)− c2 (b
c
2).
4Our assumptions ensure that these are necessary and sufficient conditions for an
optimum.
5This can be seen as follows. The first order condition is that (µ =) c′1 (b
c
1) =
c′2 (b
c
2), and hence db
c
1/db
c
2 = c
′′
2/c
′′
1 > 1. Now for any level of b
c
2 (with corresponding
bc1), we have d(c1 (b
c
1 (b
c
2))−c2 (b
c
2))/db
c
2 = c
′
1 (b
c
1) db
c
1/db
c
2− c
′
2 (b
c
2) = µ[db
c
1/db
c
2−1] >
0. Straightforward integration yields c1 (b
c
1)− c2 (b
c
2) > 0 for all b
c
2 > 0.
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4 Asymmetric Information: Uniform versus Sepa-
rating Policies
Let us now turn to the case where information is asymmetric. Each indi-
vidual farmer knows her type; the donor only knows the characteristics
of the two types (Fi and ci(b), i = 1, 2) and the total number of farmers
(n1 and n2) but does not know which farmer is of what type. Before
characterizing the exact optimal policy (in the next section), we first
establish whether the optimal solution under asymmetric information is
separating, or uniform. Here, the donor needs to take into account the
incentive compatibility constraints given in (2), and the problem is to
find the menu {(S1, b1) , (S2, b2)} which satisfies the following:
min S˜ = n1S1 + n2S2, (5a)
s.t. B ≤ n1b1 + n2b2, (5b)
Fi + ci (bi)− Si ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, (5c)
ci (bi)− Si ≤ ci (bj)− Sj , i, j = 1, 2, i 	= j. (5d)
Isocost functions are a useful tool to evaluate farmer preferences when
comparing multiple policy combinations. These functions represent the
sets of policy combinations (S, b) for which farmer type i’s total (net)
costs are constant and equal to ki: ki = Fi+ci(b)−S. Since
db
dS
∣∣
ki
= 1
c′
i
(b)
,
isocost functions are upward—sloping and concave in (S, b) space; see
Figure 1. Because c′2(b) > c
′
1(b), the isocost function of a type 1 farmer
is strictly steeper in any policy combination (S, b) than that of a type
2 farmer; db
dS
∣∣
k1
> db
dS
∣∣
k2
. Finally, costs decrease whenever the required
effort level is lower and the subsidy is larger, and hence isocost functions
located to the south—east are preferred to those located to the north—
west (as is illustrated in Figure 1 for type 1 farmers, where k¯′1 > k¯1).
Or, put differently, for a given isocost function, all policy combinations
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bS
k1 = k1
(Su, bu)•
k2 = k2
k1 = k1’
Figure 1: A subsidy-saving deviation from the least-cost uniform policy.
located to the south—east (north—west) of this function result in lower
(higher) net total costs.
Figure 1 allows us to show the intuition behind the result that under
asymmetric information the least—cost uniform policy (3) is never opti-
mal. Consider (Su, bu) as depicted in Figure 1. We can have either k¯1 = 0
(if C1(b
u) > C2(b
u), implying k¯2 < 0) or k¯2 = 0 (if C1(b
u) < C2(b
u), im-
plying k¯1 < 0). We now prove that the total amount of subsidies can
always be decreased (as compared to the uniform case) by designing a
menu of policy combinations. We do this by showing that the aggregate
amount of subsidies offered falls if the donor sets the policy combina-
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tion targeted at type 1 farmers on the k1 = k¯1 line to the north—east of
(Su, bu), and the combination targeted at type 2 farmers on the k2 = k¯2
line to the south—west of (Su, bu). Such a set of combinations is both
incentive—compatible and decreases the total amount of subsidies paid.
The analysis is as follows. First note that decreasing b2 implies in-
creasing b1 as the aggregate conservation objective B¯ always needs to be
met. Totally differentiating the conservation constraint yields db1/db2 =
− (n2/n1). Next, given dbi we can infer the required increase in subsi-
dies (dSi) such that the farmer’s total net costs remain unchanged; this
equals ∂Si(b
u)/∂b = c′i(b
u). Now the aggregate amount of subsidies re-
quired (S˜) varies with b2 as follows: dS˜/db2 = n1
∂S1(bu)
∂b1
db1
db2
+ n2
∂S2(bu)
∂b2
=
n2(c
′
2(b
u)− c′1(b
u)) > 0. Therefore, starting from (Su, bu), marginally de-
creasing b2 (and concomitantly increasing b1) reduces the total amount
of subsidies paid. Finally, when moving along the two ki = k¯i lines as in-
dicated, each farmer strictly prefers the new policy combination targeted
at her type.
Hence, the uniform policy is never optimal; independent of the num-
ber of farmers being of type 1 or type 2 (n1 and n2), it is always cheaper
to induce the low—cost (high—cost) farmers to undertake slightly more
(less) conservation effort. Also note that incentive compatible policies
are then characterized by higher (lower) effort levels and subsidies in-
tended for the low (high) variable cost type. Note that this result is
independent of the level of the fixed costs.
5 The Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
Let us now address the question whether the complete information so-
lution (4a)—(4d) can be incentive compatible in the presence of fixed
costs. The complete information solution is incentive compatible if and
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only if (5c) holds with strict equality for i = 1, 2, and (5d) is met for
(i, j) = (1, 2) and (i, j) = (2, 1). Combining these four equations, we
find that the complete information solution is incentive—compatible if
and only if
c2 (b
c
2)− c1 (b
c
2) ≤ F1 − F2 ≤ c2 (b
c
1)− c1 (b
c
1) . (6)
A necessary condition for (6) to hold is that F1 > F2 ≥ 0. The reason
is that c′2(b) > c
′
1(b) for all b > 0, and hence c2(b) − c1(b) > 0. That
means that when F2 ≥ F1 ≥ 0, the first inequality in condition (6) never
holds. In case F1 > F2 ≥ 0, the condition is met for at least some values
of F1 and F2: because b
c
1 > b
c
2 and c
′
2(b) > c
′
1(b) for all b > 0, we have
c2 (b
c
2)− c1 (b
c
2) < c2 (b
c
1)− c1 (b
c
1).
6
The reason why the two fixed costs appear in the incentive compat-
ibility constraint is that their levels affect the amount of subsidies pro-
vided. This result is clear when analyzing the two inequalities in (6) sep-
arately. The first inequality can be rewritten as c2 (b
c
2)+F2 ≤ F1+c1 (b
c
2) ,
and hence 0 ≤ F1+c1 (b
c
2)−S
c
2. In words, this inequality is about the in-
centives for type 1 farmers to misrepresent their type under the complete
information solution. Their net costs are zero if they choose the policy
combination aimed at their type, and this is incentive compatible if their
net costs are positive if they misrepresent themselves. So, even though
c1 (b
c
2) < c1 (b
c
1), type 1 farmers may still prefer the policy targeted at
their type if Sc2 is sufficiently small compared to S
c
1, and this is the case if
F2 is sufficiently small compared to F1. And a similar analysis applies to
the second inequality, which can be rewritten as c1 (b
c
1)+F1 ≤ c2 (b
c
1)+F2
so that 0 ≤ F2+c2 (b
c
1)−S
c
1. Type 2 farmers have an incentive to choose
6Note that together with c′1(b) > c
′
2(b) for all b > 0, the cases F2 ≥ F1 and
F1 > F2 exhaust all possible combinations of levels of fixed costs being high or low,
and the levels of variable costs being high or low.
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the combination aimed at their type because c2 (b
c
2) < c2 (b
c
1), but they
will only do so if Sc1 (S
c
2) is sufficiently low (high), which is the case if
F1 (F2) is sufficiently small (large).
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This can also be shown graphically. Let us first consider the case
where F2 ≥ F1 ≥ 0, so that C2(b) > C1(b) for all b > 0, as represented
in Figure 2. Here, the k1 = 0 line is strictly located to the north—west of
the k2 = 0 line. Therefore, type 1 farmers prefer the contract intended
for type 2 farmers. For b = 0, the minimum amount of subsidies required
when farmers are forced to invest is Si = Fi, and F2 ≥ F1 implies that
the horizontal intercept of the k1 = 0 is (weakly) to the left of that of
the k2 = 0 line. Next, because
db
dS
∣∣
k1
> db
dS
∣∣
k2
for all b > 0, the k1 = 0
line is located strictly to the north of the k2 = 0 line. Therefore, in
this case the complete information solution (4a)—(4d) is never incentive
compatible.
The optimal policy when F2 ≥ F1 ≥ 0 is characterized by the follow-
ing conditions (for a formal proof see the Appendix):
n1 [c
′
2 (b
s
2)− c
′
1 (b
s
2)] = n2 [c
′
1 (b
s
1)− c
′
2 (b
s
2)] , (7a)
B = n1b
s
1 + n2b
s
2, (7b)
Ss2 = F2 + c2 (b
s
2) , (7c)
c1 (b
s
1)− S
s
1 − c1 (b
s
2) + S
s
2 = 0. (7d)
In this case, type 1 farmers have an incentive to misrepresent their
type under the complete information solution, but type 2 farmers do
not. Therefore, the farmers of the latter type receive a subsidy that just
covers their conservation costs (7c), whereas the former type receives
an informational rent so that their incentive compatibility constraint is
7Note that this case includes F1 = F2 = 0; the first best is never incentive
compatible if there are only variable conservation costs.
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bSF1 F2
k1 = 0
k2 = 0
k1 < 0
(Su, bu)•
•
(S1c, b1c)
(S2c, b2c)
•
Figure 2: Incentive compatibility of the complete information contracts
if F2 ≥ F1 ≥ 0.
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binding (7d). Therefore, the optimal policy is that the subsidy intended
for type 1 farmers (Ss1) more than covers their private costs of exerting
the effort level bs1, and the informational rent equals R1 ≡ S1 − F1 −
c1 (b1) ≥ 0. The question is then what levels of conservation effort should
be imposed on the two farmer types. Substituting (7c) into (7d), adding
and subtracting F1 and rewriting yields R1 = c2(b2)− c1(b2)+F2−F1 >
0. Changing b1 affects R1 and, using db2/db1 = − (n1/n2) (because of
(7b)), we have dR1/db1 = [c
′
2(b2)− c
′
1(b2)](db2/db1) = −(n1/n2)[c
′
2(b2)−
c′1(b2)] < 0. Increasing the amount of conservation effort required from
type 1 farmers increases their conservation costs and thus lowers the
informational rent they receive. Therefore, the ‘golden rule’ of c′1 (b1) =
c′2 (b2) (see the solution of (4)) needs to be modified by adding dR/db1
to the LHS, which yields:
c′1 (b
s
1)−
n1
n2
[c′2 (b
s
2)− c
′
1 (b
s
2)] = c
′
2 (b
s
2) , (8)
and this is identical to (7a). Thus, the net marginal cost of type 1 farmers
are larger than those of type 2 farmers: c′1 (b
s
1) > c
′
2 (b
s
2). Therefore,
bs1 > b
c
1 and b
s
2 < b
c
2 and, consequently, S
s
1 > S
c
1 and S
s
2 < S
c
2. Since there
is a fixed aggregate conservation objective, B, both individual effort
levels are adjusted to satisfy the optimality condition and the constraint
B.
Now, let us consider the case where F1 > F2 ≥ 0, so that the to-
tal costs incurred by type 2 farmers are not always larger than those
incurred by type 1 farmers. This case implies that k2 = 0 and k1 = 0
intersect at one particular level of b, labelled b˜ in Figure 3. We know
from the previous section that the optimal solution is always a sepa-
rating policy, and we show that in this case the complete information’s
optimal (separating) policy may even be incentive compatible. Here, the
outcome depends on the relative values of the fixed costs incurred, the
18
bSF1F2
k1 = 0
k2 = 0
b~
Figure 3: Incentive compatibility of the complete information contracts
if F1 > F2 ≥ 0.
aggregate conservation objective and on the variable cost functions.
Suppose that the complete information solution is such that either
bc2 < b
c
1 < b˜, or b˜ < b
c
2 < b
c
1. That means that in either case, one of
the two policy combination is located on the dotted part of either of
the two isocost functions in Figure 3, and the complete information’s
optimal policy is not incentive compatible. If b˜ < bc2 < b
c
1, the situation
is analogous to the one depicted in Figure 2 and hence here type 1
farmers strictly prefer the contract intended for type 2 farmers. In fact,
condition b˜ < bc2 < b
c
1 is equivalent to F1 − F2 < c2 (b
c
2) − c1 (b
c
2), which
violates (6). In that case, the optimal separating policy is again (11),
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that is an informational rent must be given to type 1 farmers.
If, however, bc2 < b
c
1 < b˜, type 2 farmers strictly prefer the contract
intended for type 1 farmers. Here, condition bc2 < b
c
1 < b˜ is equivalent to
F1−F2 > c2 (b
c
1)− c1 (b
c
1) . The optimal policy is then again a separating
contract, characterized now by the following conditions:
n2 [c
′
2 (b
s
1)− c
′
1 (b
s
1)] = n1 [c
′
1 (b
s
1)− c
′
2 (b
s
2)] , (9a)
B = n1b
s
1 + n2b
s
2, (9b)
Ss1 = F1 + c1 (b
s
1) , (9c)
c2 (b
s
2)− S
s
2 − c2 (b
s
1) + S
s
1 = 0. (9d)
The interpretation is analogous to that of (11). Type 1 farmers have
no incentive to misrepresent their type when facing the complete infor-
mation’s optimal policy menu, but type 2 farmers do. Therefore, type 1
farmers are just compensated for their extra costs (9c), but type 2 farm-
ers receive an informational rent such that their incentive compatibility
constraint (9d) is binding. From (9b)—(9d) we can derive (9a) in exactly
the same fashion as we obtained (7a) from (7b)—(7d). In this case, we
also have bs1 > b
c
1, b
s
2 < b
c
2, S
s
1 > S
c
1 and S
s
2 < S
c
2.
If, however, bc2 ≤ b˜ ≤ b
c
1 (with at least one of the two inequalities
being strict), the complete information solution is incentive—compatible,
since condition (6) holds. For type 2 farmers the difference in subsidies
(Sc1 — S
c
2) is always smaller than the increase in variable costs they incur
when representing themselves as type 1 farmers; for type 1 farmers the
change in subsidies is always larger than the variable cost savings they
obtain because of having to meet less strict management requirements
(bc2 versus b
c
1).
Next, we address the question how likely it is that bc2 ≤ b˜ ≤ b
c
1. Or,
equivalently, how likely is it that condition (6) holds in practice? As seen
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Figure 4: The range of differences in fixed costs (ABCD and A’B’C’D’)
for which the complete information contracts are incentive compatible,
as a function of the minimum required level of conservation.
before, a necessary condition is that the farmer type with low marginal
conservation costs has larger fixed costs, i.e., F1 > F2. For a certain level
of aggregate conservation, B¯, the difference F1 — F2 > 0must lie between
two bounds, as shown in (6).
Consider Figure 4, where we depict the complete information solution
(bc1, b
c
2), such that c
′
1 = c
′
2 = µ and B =
∑
i nib
c
i . Note that the left—hand
side of (6) equals area 0AB, while its right—hand side equals 0CD. If F1
— F2 is larger than 0AB but smaller than 0CD, the complete information
solution is incentive compatible. Now assume an increase in the required
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level of conservation effort, B, increasing the corresponding individual
effort levels to (bc′1 , b
c′
2 ). Graphically, it is easy to see that both the left—
and right—hand side bounds of (6) increase, but that the increase of the
right—hand side bound is larger (as dbc1/db
c
2 > 1).
8
This analysis shows that, on the one hand, the interval for the ‘allow-
able’ difference in fixed costs (i.e., the range of differences in fixed costs
that result in the complete information’s optimal policy being incentive
compatible) increases if aggregate conservation effort B increases. On
the other hand, a higher B also implies that the lower bound of the
interval is increased, so that smaller differences in fixed costs prevent
the complete information solution from being incentive compatible. As
a consequence, when F1 > F2, only intermediate levels of aggregate
conservation can be implemented without any informational distortions.
Obviously, this range of intermediate aggregate conservation levels is di-
rectly related to the difference in farmers’ marginal costs. Therefore,
the larger this difference, the larger the range of aggregate conservation
levels with which the complete information’s optimal policy is incentive
compatible.
6 Conclusions
This paper revisits the conclusions of the literature on incentive—compatible
contracts and finds that, when taking into account the presence of fixed
conservation costs, the double cost of separation (that is, the informa-
tional rents plus the distortions on individual conservation efforts) do
not necessarily occur. While in the case of just variable costs the low—
cost farmers always obtain an informational rent whereas the high—cost
8Mathematically, the bandwidth for F1− F2 is given by Z ≡ [c2 (bc1)− c1 (b
c
1)]−
[c2 (b
c
2) − c1 (b
c
2)]. If B¯ increases by dB¯, then db2 = dB¯/[n1(c
′′
2/c
′′
1) + n2] > 0,
and db1 = (c
′′
2/c
′′
1)db2 > db2 > 0. Hence, dZ/dB¯ =
1
[n1(c′′2 /c
′′
1
)+n2]
[c′2 (b
c
1) −
c′1 (b
c
1)](c
′′
2/c
′′
1)− [c
′
2 (b
c
2)− c
′
1 (b
c
2)] > 0.
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farmers are confronted with less strict management requirements than
under complete information, this is not necessarily the case when con-
servation entails fixed costs too. Then, if farmers with lower variable
conservation costs face higher fixed costs (and vice versa), the complete
information solution can be incentive compatible. Given the relevance of
fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive—compatible
contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce
conservation.
7 Appendix 1
The Lagrangian of the donor’s minimization problem in the presence of
asymmetric information (see 5)) is the following
L=n1S1 + n2S2 + µ
[
B − n1b1 − n2b2
]
+
∑
i
λi [Fi + ci (bi)− Si] +
γ1 [c1 (b1)− S1 − c1 (b2) + S2] + γ2 [c2 (b2)− S2 − c2 (b1) + S1] ,
where µ ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0 are the corresponding Kuhn—Tucker multi-
pliers.
The corresponding conditions for an optimum are:
λ1c
′
1 (b1)− µn1 + γ1c
′
1 (b1)− γ2c
′
2 (b1) = 0, (10)
λ2c
′
2 (b2)− µn2 − γ1c
′
1 (b2) + γ2c
′
2 (b2) = 0, (11)
n1 − λ1 − γ1 + γ2 = 0, (12)
n2 − λ2 + γ1 − γ2 = 0, (13)
µ
[
B − n1b1 − n2b2
]
= 0; B − n1b1 − n2b2 ≤ 0, (14)
λi [Fi + ci (bi)− Si] = 0; Fi + ci (bi)− Si ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, (15)
γ1 [c1 (b1)− S1 − c1 (b2) + S2] = 0; c1 (b1)− S1 − c1 (b2) + S2 ≤ 0,(16)
γ2 [c2 (b2)− S2 − c2 (b1) + S1] = 0; c2 (b2)− S2 − c2 (b1) + S1 ≤ 0.(17)
The case where λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, γ1 = γ2 = 0 corresponds to
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the complete information solution, where µ = c′1 (b
c
1) = c
′
2 (b
c
2) > 0,
B = n1b
c
1 + n2b
c
2 and Fi + ci (b
c
i) − S
c
i = 0 for all i, and has been dis-
cussed already in section 3. The complete information’s optimal policy
is incentive compatible if and only if (16) and (17) hold, that is, when
c1 (b
c
1) − S
c
1 − c1 (b
c
2) + S
c
2 ≤ 0 and c2 (b
c
2) − S
c
2 − c2 (b
c
1) + S
c
1 ≤ 0.
Since Sci = Fi + ci (b
c
i) for all i, the two conditions reduce, respec-
tively, to F1 − F2 ≥ c2 (b
c
2) − c1 (b
c
2) and F1 − F2 ≤ c2 (b
c
1) − c1 (b
c
1) .
Since c′1 (b
c
1) = c
′
2 (b
c
2) and c
′
2 (b) > c
′
1 (b) for all b > 0, we then have
bc1 > b
c
2. Integrating over the relevant range, we can conclude that
c2 (b
c
1) − c1 (b
c
1) > c2 (b
c
2) − c1 (b
c
2). Therefore, there exists a range of
values for F1 − F2 such that the complete information’s optimal policy
is incentive compatible, which is the following:
c2 (b
c
2)− c1 (b
c
2) ≤ F1 − F2 ≤ c2 (b
c
1)− c1 (b
c
1) . (18)
Now assume that F1−F2 < c2 (b
c
2)−c1 (b
c
2). Then, condition c1 (b
c
1)−
Sc1−c1 (b
c
2)+S
c
2 ≤ 0 does not hold. In the complete information solution,
type 1 prefers the policy targeted at type 2. By (16), the incentive
compatibility constraint for type 1 must be binding and γ1 > 0. Note
that λ1 = λ2 = 0 is not possible since (12) and (13) then yield n1 = − n2.
Therefore, we can have either (i) λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0 or (ii) λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0.
Consider case (i) where λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. There are two subcases,
(ia) γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0 and (ib) γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0. Clearly, subcase
(ib) is not possible because, by (13), n2 = − γ1 < 0, which is a con-
tradiction. Subcase (ia) corresponds to the uniform policy described in
(3), where both incentive compatibility constraints are binding. In that
case, conditions (10) and (11) reduce to:
λ1c
′
1 (b
u)− µn1 + γ1c
′
1 (b
u)− γ2c
′
2 (b
u)= 0, (19)
−µn2 − γ1c
′
1 (b
u) + γ2c
′
2 (b
u)= 0. (20)
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Combining both conditions we obtain µ = c′1 (b
u) . From (12) and
(13), we have λ1 = n1 + n2 and γ1 = γ2 − n2. Substituting these
expressions in (19), we then obtain γ2 [c
′
2 (b
u)− c′1 (b
u)] = 0, which is
only possible when γ2 = 0, since we assume that c
′
2 (b) > c
′
1 (b) for
all b > 0. But we were assuming γ2 > 0, and therefore we obtain a
contradiction. Thus, subcase (ia) is impossible either.
Now consider case (ii) where λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0. Again, two subcases
are possible: (iia) γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0 and (iib) γ1 > 0, γ2 = 0. Subcase
(iia) corresponds again to the possibility of a uniform policy. A similar
procedure to the one described for subcase (ia) lead us to conclude that
γ1 = 0, which is a contradiction. Finally, we explore case (iib) γ1 >
0, γ2 = 0. The combination of equations (10) to (13) lead us to the
optimality condition:
n1 [c
′
2 (b
s
2)− c
′
1 (b
s
2)] = n2 [c
′
1 (b
s
1)− c
′
2 (b
s
2)] ,
which characterizes the optimal separating policy, together with the con-
ditionsB = n1b
s
1+n2b
s
2, S
s
2 = F2+c2 (b
s
2) and c1 (b
s
1)− S
s
1−c1 (b
s
2)+S
s
2 = 0.
Now, consider the case where F1 − F2 > c2 (b
c
1) − c1 (b
c
1) . Then,
condition c2 (b
c
2) − S
c
2 − c2 (b
c
1) + S
c
1 ≤ 0 does not hold and, by (17),
the incentive compatibility constraint for type 2 must be binding and
γ2 > 0. Now, in the complete information solution, type 2 prefers the
policy targeted at type 1. A similar proof as the one described before
lead us to conclude that the optimum in this case is characterized by
γ1 = 0, λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. Thus, combining equations (10) to (13), we
now obtain the following optimality condition:
n2 [c
′
2 (b
s
1)− c
′
1 (b
s
1)] = n1 [c
′
1 (b
s
1)− c
′
2 (b
s
2)] ,
together with the conditions B = n1b
s
1 + n2b
s
2, S
s
1 = F1 + c1 (b
s
1) and
c2 (b
s
2) − S
s
2 − c2 (b
s
1) + S
s
1 = 0. So, again, the optimal policy is a
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separating one.
Summarizing, the optimal policy under incomplete information is al-
ways separating. If F1 − F2 is sufficiently small, there is a distortion:
the complete information policy is not incentive compatible, and an in-
formational rent is needed for type 1 farmers. Conversely, if F1 − F2
is sufficiently large, an informational rent is needed for type 2 farm-
ers. Only for intermediate values of F1 − F2, the complete information
solution can be implemented.
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